FACTUAL accuracy is a regular casualty in discussion of nuclear issues in Australia. The tendency of certain industry sectors and parts of government to overstate the economic benefits of nuclear power and dismiss genuine concerns over nuclear safety has been well canvassed. Yet far less attention has been paid to examining the coherence of the arguments put forward by those who resist Australia's involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle as a supplier of uranium. Recent observations by Australian Greens senator Scott Ludlam seeking to justify his party's opposition to Australian uranium exports presents an chance to test these arguments.
The essential thrust of his case is that it is impossible to distinguish between the civilian and military utilization of nuclear energy and that, as a consequence, any promotion of civilian nuclear power will unavoidably promote its use for military purposes. However, there are severe flaws in this argument. Since 1945, global nuclear proliferation dynamics have remained mainly disconnected from the civilian nuclear industry. Every nuclear weapons program since and including the US Manhattan Project has been the product of devoted military reactors rather than an offshoot of civilian programs.
Fissile materials for nuclear weapons growth programs are the product of special-purpose reactors, not a consequence of civilian reactor programs, whose mix of nuclear fuel is specifically calibrated for generating electricity and other utility outputs. There is simply no historical proof to support the proposition that civilian nuclear reactor programs fuel weapons proliferation. Today, there are a mere nine nuclear weapons states in the international system despite the fact that more than 1000 nuclear reactors have function across several continents since the 1940s. All nuclear weapons states obtain their arsenals through purpose-built military facilities, not as a by-product of civilian reactors.
The essential thrust of his case is that it is impossible to distinguish between the civilian and military utilization of nuclear energy and that, as a consequence, any promotion of civilian nuclear power will unavoidably promote its use for military purposes. However, there are severe flaws in this argument. Since 1945, global nuclear proliferation dynamics have remained mainly disconnected from the civilian nuclear industry. Every nuclear weapons program since and including the US Manhattan Project has been the product of devoted military reactors rather than an offshoot of civilian programs.
Fissile materials for nuclear weapons growth programs are the product of special-purpose reactors, not a consequence of civilian reactor programs, whose mix of nuclear fuel is specifically calibrated for generating electricity and other utility outputs. There is simply no historical proof to support the proposition that civilian nuclear reactor programs fuel weapons proliferation. Today, there are a mere nine nuclear weapons states in the international system despite the fact that more than 1000 nuclear reactors have function across several continents since the 1940s. All nuclear weapons states obtain their arsenals through purpose-built military facilities, not as a by-product of civilian reactors.
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